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SUMMARY 
The aim of this study is to examine the relevance of capital structure theories in the Hungarian service sector between 
2008 and 2014. The service sector stands in the centre of research, as the role of this sector is becoming more and more 
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shows an increasing trend in developed societies. The paper focuses on three factors. Firstly, I examine whether the 
classical theory is relevant, in which there is a negative linkage between profitability and capital leverage. Secondly, I 
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if firms in the service sector keep the golden rule to finance their non-current assets from non-current liabilities and 
equity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The corporate capital structure means, in the classical 
sense, the ratio between the non-current liabilities and 
equity, which is voluntarily created and modified by the 
corporates. To acquire new financing sources, the 
company can issue new shares, which increases the equity 
base, or can take out a non-current loan and/or issue bonds, 
which raises the share of non-current liabilities. The main 
questions of theoretical and empirical researches related to 
the capital structure are the following:  
1) Is there any optimal ratio between the two types of 
financing sources by which the value of the company 
can be maximised?  
2) What kind of aspects should be considered by 
corporate managers when they make decisions on the 
way of financing an investment?  
3) What is the correct requisition order of financing 
opportunities?  
No consensus has been reached related to these 
questions, either in theory or in empirical studies. My 
study examines these issues after introducing the related 
theories.  
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agency Theory in Corporate Finance  
Generally, the financing markets do not operate 
perfectly efficiently, nor do they operate cost-free. Jensen 
and Meckling were the first to dealt with the theory based 
on agency cost (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The capital 
structure theory based on agency cost developed by them 
is based on the incomplete contract and information 
asymmetry.  
The principal-agent relationship is established among 
people or groups when the principals delegate their 
ownership or other interests to an agent or a group of 
people working as an agent (Williamson 1988). The 
principal delegates his/her right to an agent if he/she judges 
that he/she is unable or does not wish to represent his/her 
interest independently due to the lack of knowledge, time 
or other resources. 
The principal-agent theory assumes that the partners 
maximise their utilities in the principal-agent relationship, 
they behave in a rational and opportunistic manner and the 
maximisation of their own benefit is not inhibited by any 
harm of the partner’s interest.  
The agent theory explains the capital structure of 
corporations where the management and the ownership are 
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separated. The informational problem of agency theory is 
based on the fact that any economic actor has extra 
information, but it is probable, that in the future one of 
them will have extra information. He/she is called the 
agent, whereas the other partner, the principal, is the one 
who wants to ensure in a contract that the agent should act 
in his/her interest. If there is a deterministic linkage 
between the operation of the agent and the result of the 
operation, no problem arises. The problem occurs if the 
linkage is stochastic. If the compensation of the agent is 
exclusively the function of the output, the agent bears risk 
from the stochastic linkage. If the compensation is 
independent from the output, the agent is not encouraged 
to follow the principal’s interest.  
A further risk for the principal is that the agent – since 
he/she serves other’s interests – tends to bear excessive 
risk, since he/she shares in the potential high return, but in 
case of loss only the principal’s interest and wealth are 
damaged (moral hazard). The root of the problem is that 
the interests of the principal and the agent differ, and they 
try to solve this problem by making a proper contract. The 
manager is generally interested in the value increase of the 
organisation, while the shareholders are interested in the 
share price increase.  
a) The conflict between managers and shareholders  
In this case, the shareholders are the principals and the 
company management is the agent. The aim of 
shareholders is to persuade the company management to 
make decisions that maximise the value of the company. 
The problem is that the principals do not have accurate 
information about the investment opportunities of the firm, 
and the value of the company does not depend solely on 
the efforts of the management. In the theory, if the 
management discloses some actions, it bears the total cost, 
but it shares in the profit only through its ownership share 
(Mikolasek and Sulyok-Pap 1996). Generally, the 
management strives to overinvest. Even the management 
is not willing to liquidate the company if its net asset value 
is larger than the market price of the company.  
In the representatives of the theory the increase of 
leverage is a satisfactory solution in these circumstances, 
since it decreases the free cash-flow spending on 
investments, and makes liquidation easier to enforce 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Conflicts during the company operation between the 
personal goals of the management and the wealth 
maximisation of the owners may relate to the following 
fields:  
 management of assets/investment decisions 
 financing issues 
 dividend payment. 
In investment decisions, the basic appearance of the 
interest conflict is the difference of risk levels. The owner 
is interested in more risky projects, while the manager 
prefers the less risky investments, since the probability of 
default is lower. In financing decisions, the owner is 
interested in utilising the tax shield (higher debt level); the 
manager prefers to maintain liquidity and lower 
indebtedness to avoid bankruptcy. The conflict of interest 
between the owner and the manager in dividend payment 
comes from the fact that the interest of owner is to increase 
the value of sharess by receiving dividends; the manager 
strives to increase the retained earnings, which finance 
investments. Several options are available for the 
shareholders to encourage the management to consider the 
interest of the owners; the aim of the management is to 
maintain a balance between the shareholders’ interests and 
the long-term interest of the company.  
The following studies formulate and deduct findings 
related to the American capital market. Their aim was to 
make transparent the partners’ interests.  
Conflict of ownership-management interests in 
investment decisions:   
1. The management undertakes investments only in a good 
liquidity position. If the liquidity of the company is 
fragile, then even investments with positive net present 
value are not realised. Research has discovered a 
positive linkage between the size of equity and the 
investments.  
2. A special appearance of management’s interest is the 
building of a corporate empire, increasing of the 
company size by takeovers. The mergers and takeovers 
ensure greater influence for the management and 
higher return due to the economics of scale. The 
management carries out even the weaker projects 
(overinvestment).  
3. If the company has relatively high debt, the management 
is encouraged to seek new investment opportunities to 
increase the income generation of the company (the 
higher income and the bigger asset collateral make the 
debt service safer and the rating higher). By seeking the 
investment opportunities, the risk appetite is also 
increasing, so the conflict of interest between owner 
and management decreases.  
4. If the company has internal liquidity, and this exceeds 
the value of investment opportunities, the management 
repays the liabilities and equity (loan repayment, 
repurchase of shares, dividend payment), which 
decreases the conflict of interest. (Ross et al. 1996; 
Harris & Raviv 1991; McConnel J.& Servaes H.1995). 
Conflicts of interest between owner and management 
in financing decisions:  
1. The owners often think that the corporate’s leverage is 
too low, and the company does not utilise the tax shield 
of the loan. The rise of lending – in a favourable cash-
flow position – may increase the income of the 
shareholders. In the USA, most of the companies have 
low leverage, and that is why their corporate tax 
commitments are significant, which supports the view 
that the management is too careful in lending, and 
avoids threats to the company’s liquidity.  
2. The external owners interpret signals in the lack of real 
internal performance indicators, and try to deduce from 
them the size of real corporate income. The lending is 
one of these signals; if the managers raise a loan, the 
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external owners deduct a good liquidity position, since 
the management (presumably having reliable 
information) undertakes the higher debt stock.   
3. The management forms a multifactorial preference 
system in practice, in which the corporate specific 
factors have a significant role. So, the corporate asset 
features (significant tangible assets lead to high 
leverage, whereas significant intangible assets indicate 
equity finance), the uncertainty and fluctuation of 
operational profit, growing potential, financial 
independence, and the maintenance of flexibility 
determine the leverage (Ross et al., 1996)” (Szórádiné 
Szabó 2005). 
What are the most important tools of owners’ 
influence? One is to offer shares to managers, since the 
higher the share of the management in the company; the 
lower the “money-wasting” manner of management. In 
these situations, the manager prefers t investments that 
bear less risk. Another option is for the investors to 
introduce monitoring and control measures to decrease the 
agent costs. The monitoring follows the performance of the 
company and the management. Control mechanisms, legal 
norms and moral rules keep the management acting for the 
benefit of the owners. Monitoring means a general control 
framework and is part of the broad contract features by 
which the owner determines the acting scope of the 
management. Lending is an essential element, since it 
forces the company to pay cash, and limit the free cash 
flow available for the agent.1 
b) The conflict between bondholders and shareholders  
The conflict among bondholders and shareholders is 
rooted in asset substitution. Both the bond and the share 
have option characteristics; the share is simply a call 
option. The shareholders have got the opportunity to 
influence the parameters of the underlying assets.  If the 
volatility of the underlying asset increases, then the 
option’s value rises. The shareholders’ interest is to 
increase the value of the equity, not the value of the whole 
company.  For this reason, it can be imagined that the 
shareholders invest even if the net present value is 
negative, but the project has got substantial risk. The 
bondholders try to stand up against this, but they have got 
only two tools. These are: 
1. They try to control the company to describe broader 
information services of the company. This makes the 
loan more expensive, because this means incremental 
costs for the company. 
2. They interfere in the investment decisions; however, the 
management always has an advantage over the 
investors, since it is better informed and has a 
comparative advantage in company management.  
The supporters of the theory draw the conclusion, that 
the asset substitution problem may decrease the leverage 
in case of some investors, but we should consider two 
important effects by determining the leverage.  
1. Management reputation: The management is not 
always interested only in high return, but in the success 
of the company, which may counterbalance the effect 
of asset substitution. In the opinion of some 
researchers, the companies directed by management 
with a low reputation more often becomes the object of 
a takeover; that is the reason why the leverage in 
companies facing with hostile takeover is so low.  
2. Corporate reputation: If the company is qualified as a 
reliable debtor by its credit record, then it can access 
loans at lower interest rates. Thus, a company with a 
good reputation benefits by maintaining its good credit 
record and this may decrease the asset substitution 
effect. (Mikolasek & Sulyok-Pap 1996). 
The primary areas of bondholder-shareholder conflicts 
of interest are the following: 
1. Investment decisions: The owners often try to solve 
problems stemming from a weak liquidity position and 
bankruptcy-close circumstances by starting new 
investments. However, the lenders try to avoid the risk 
and do not approve the new investments in these 
situations.  
2. Financing decisions: The interest of lenders is good 
solvency, high liquidity and retaining the profit for the 
company.  
3. Dividend policy: Considering the size of the dividend 
the lender’s and the shareholder’s interest differ in the 
short term, since the shareholder wants to receive 
income from the company, while the lender wants to 
retain the profit. A shareholder investing in the long run 
gives up his/her immediate income to increase the 
company’s value and the share price by making 
investments with a positive net present value.  
Further cases in the owner-lender’s conflict of interest 
according to empirical research:  
1. Owners of a company close to bankruptcy often want 
to make new investments to improve the profitability, 
but the risk of these actions is borne by the lenders.  
2. If the lender judges that the corporate performance or 
the result of the investment is worse than could have 
been foreseen at the granting of the loan, the lower 
income decreases the value of the company (i.e. future 
cash inflow, the value of the assets). The risk of interest 
and principal repayment is increasing for the lenders, 
while the asset value as collateral becomes lower. The 
lender is likely to change the rating of the company, but 
the increasing interest rate and the additional 
collaterals decrease the cash income of the owner.  
 
 
1  Lending does not always trigger the same control effect. If the company grows rapidly and has projects with high profit potential but its free-cash 
flow is limited, this method is less effective. However, if the company’s growth potential is limited and has significant free-cash flow, the method 
could be very effective. (Jensen-Meckling 1976) 
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3. The company raises a new loan, whose collateral is the 
available assets. The cost of loans is lower due to the 
good collateral. The new loan withdraws value from 
the lenders of the old assets. (If the new investment is 
not successful, the old assets cover the principal and 
interest payment of the new investment.)  
4. The dividend payment and the share repurchase may 
be fields of conflict of interest. If the dividend payment 
significantly rises or some shares are repurchased due 
to the good liquidity position, this decreases the cash 
balance of the company, and the worse liquidity may 
lead to a worse rating (Ross et al. 1996)” (Szórádiné 
Szabó 2005). 
What are the main tools of lender’s influence? The 
appropriate tools exist in all the above-mentioned cases. 
All the tools should be included in the loan contract so that 
the best one can be applied in case of need.  
Another valuable tool is the rating, which can select the 
potential insolvent debtor. The credit monitoring makes 
possible the ordinary control of the company and the 
modification of the loan contract if new circumstances 
emerge. However, these tools are available only in case of 
bank finance, while in case of bond finance the 
opportunities are limited.  
Theories Based on Asymmetric Information  
The main idea of these theories is that one of the 
economic actors has more information than the rest of the 
actors. However, the others observe this actor’s actions, 
and try to deduce the missing information. Therefore, these 
theories are often called signalling theories.  
In case of leverage we assume that the corporate 
manager has the incremental information and he/she can 
judge the credit rating of the managed corporate, whereas 
the investors do not have internal information. They are 
observing the “signals” of the management. A good 
company naturally strives to differentiate itself from bad 
ones, the question is only whether they can send believable 
signals to the investors. The introduced models examine 
how they can send good signals by modifying the leverage.  
The two classical models introduced here have several 
versions.  
Pecking order theory 
One explanation of the pecking order theory is based 
on information asymmetry. The asymmetric information 
comes from the fact that the management precisely knows 
what the value of the company is and what the net present 
value of the ongoing investments is, whereas the investors 
do not know exactly this, because they have less 
information than the management. When the financing of 
a project should be decided, the management focuses on 
two things: the net present value of the project and the cost 
of finance. The project is worth financing from equity 
issue if the company’s shares are overvalued (since their 
price is higher than their value). Overpricing occurs if the 
incremental information available to the management is 
unfavourable and the market overvalues the share. If the 
managers – based on favourable information – know that 
the market undervalues the company shares, then they 
make a loss by issuing new shares and they give up the 
investment with positive net present value (Frank Murry 
Z. & Goyal Vidhan D.2003).  
The theory predicts that the management seeks a 
financing source whose value least depends on the 
discrepancy of information, and whose value moderately 
changes when the information become public. This source 
may be first an internal source (in case of risk-free debt 
neither underpricing nor overpricing occurs, but the 
corporate debt is not risk free), thereafter corporate debt, 
and finally shares, which directly depend on the company 
value.  
The pecking order theory first occurred in Donaldson 
(1961), who stated based on a corporate sample that the 
management uses firstly internal sources to finance its 
projects, and last turns to share issue. Related articles are 
(Myers 1984), (Myers &Majluf 1984) and  (Harris & 
Raviv 1991). 
According to the (Myers &Majluf 1984) study, the 
management has excess information compared to the 
market actors; if the management finances the corporate 
investments from share issue, then the market actors 
deduct from this that the management considers the share 
price overvalued and the share price will fall due to this 
belief.  Naturally, this does not serve the interest of the 
shareholders. Thus, managers try to avoid the share issue 
and choose an alternative way of financing not to 
undermine the share price.  
Myers (2001) summarises the core of the theory in the 
following way:  
 Corporations prefer internal finance.  
 The targeted dividend ratio is justified to the 
investment opportunities, nevertheless the 
management cares of flatting the fluctuation of 
dividend payment.  
 With a rigid dividend policy, the unforeseen 
fluctuation of profit and investment opportunities 
results in the free cash flow being sometimes higher, 
sometimes lower than the capital expenses. If the free 
cash flow is more, the company repays the debt or 
invests in marketable securities; if it is less, the 
company uses its reserves or sells its securities. 
 If the company needs an external source of finance, the 
company issues the most secure paper first, issues 
corporate bonds (raises a loan), then issues a hybrid 
paper like a convertible bond. The higher the riskiness 
of the assets, the higher the probability of financial 
distress. If there is no further space to borrow, and the 
potential cost of financial distress is significant, then it 
supplies the additional financial needs from share 
issue.  
In the pecking order theory, there is no optimal 
liability/equity ratio. There are two types of equity: 
external and internal. The external equity (share issue) 
stands at the bottom of the hierarchy, the internal equity 
(retained profit) is on the top of it. The size of liabilities 
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mirrors the cumulative needs for external sources. 
However, there is a threshold of the liabilities’ size, and if 
the needs exceed this, the company issues shares.  
The pecking order theory has got an alternative starting 
point, namely, if the companies want to minimise the 
transaction cost of financing. This viewpoint is neglected 
in the professional literature, but I find it important to 
express this idea, because I think that the minimising of 
transaction cost has explanatory power in fact. In this 
approach, the enterprises choose at first those financing 
sources whose transaction costs are smallest, and turn only 
to new sources if the former sources are exhausted. There 
is a strict hierarchy among the sources (Brealey & Myers, 
1992). The order of the main financing sources in this 
theory is the following:  
1. Internal sources 
1.1. Retained profit 
1.2. Depreciation 
1.3. Decrease in working capital 
1.4. Sale of fixed assets 
2. External sources 
2.1. Liabilities 
2.1.1. Sources from the trading cycle 
2.1.1.1. Account payable, bill of exchange 
2.1.1.2. Tax- and labour cost commitments 
2.1.2. Indirect liabilities 
2.1.2.1. Bank loan, bill of exchange 
discounting 
2.1.2.2. Factoring 
2.1.2.3. Leasing 
2.1.3. Direct liabilities 
2.1.3.1. Bond issue 
2.2. Equity 
2.2.1. Share issue 
Thus, the company orders its sources by their 
transaction costs and calls on the following sources if the 
former sources are exhausted (Brealey & Myers (1992)).  
The financial manager firstly chooses between the 
internal and external sources. Internal sources are those 
incomes, which come from the operation of the company. 
The external sources are provided by an external entity.  
Internal sources come from the company’s realised net 
revenue and other incomes. If we deduct the payable cost 
and expenses from the realised, collected revenue, we 
receive the internal sources. By another approach the 
internal sources are the sum of the retained profit, the 
depreciation and the potential asset sale. Here firstly the 
cash inflow from decrease of claims, stocks and 
receivables should be considered as asset sale, secondary 
the income from real estate, equipment and vehicle sales. 
1. The main advantage of internal sources is that their 
transaction cost is zero.  
2. There is no return expectation determined by a contract 
– as opposed to a loan – so if business is bad, its 
financial position will not be worse.  
3. Internal sources are eternal sources; they are not 
burdened by repayment obligation.  
However, it is not true that internal sources are cheap 
sources. The internal source is the money of the 
shareholders, and shareholders require the return of equity. 
Some managers tend to forget this and, since they have no 
valuable investment opportunities, they accumulate an 
insufficient stock of cash and securities. These assets do 
not earn so high a return, meaning that return of total assets 
decreases, thus the return expectations of shareholdrs are 
also reduced. These companies could become takeover 
targets.2 Considering this, here is good advice for the 
company managers:  
1. If the company has got too many sources, and they 
cannot be reinvested with higher return than its 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), then the 
company should pay back its loans or pay dividends to 
the owners. Money should be saved, if the investors 
can be convinced that the money is needed for future 
profitable investments. The success of this effort can 
be measured by the share prices.  
2. If the share price doesn’t increase, the company has not 
successfully communicated that future acquisitions 
require a high cash reserve; the company risks a hostile 
takeover. 
The big problem with using internal sources is that 
their size is limited for a rapidly growing company.  
In the pecking order theory, the company turns to 
external sources if its internal sources cannot meet the 
financing needs. The external sources can be split in two 
parts – liabilities and new equity. The liabilities should be 
paid back sooner or later. Their most typical type is the 
bank loan. Equity does not need to be paid back; it is 
available till the liquidation of the company. A typical 
example of new equity is a share issue.  
It could be surprising, but in the pecking order theory, 
if the indebtedness of the company is not high, liabilities 
are preferred against equity. The arguments of the pecking 
order theory in favour of liabilities are the following:  
1. Dilution effect – This is the viewpoint of owners. If 
they issue new shares, the share of existing 
shareholders will decline. By decreasing ownership 
share their influence over management also declines, 
and so does their share in dividend income.  
2. The owners’ return expectation is always bigger than 
that of the creditors, because the owners bear higher 
risk. That is why the company can get a larger amount 
of loan than equity for a given amount of return. The 
equity risk is bigger for three reasons:  
a. The yield of a loan is fixed in a contract, while the 
yield of equity depends on the future performance 
of the company.  
b. The principal of a loan will be paid back sometime 
in the future. The equity invested in an enterprise 
can be withdrawn only after the liquidation of the 
company. The equity share can be sold earlier to 
another investor, but the big question here is the 
price.  
 
2  We can find examples of the above phenomena in the Hungarian economy realised by leverage buyout.  
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c. During a liquidation process the creditors are 
advanced against the owners. After satisfying the 
creditors the owners very often receive nothing. 
3. Convincing new potential owners to buy shares 
requires much more money and energy and the process 
takes much more time due to the higher perceived risk. 
Consequently, the transaction cost of equity is much 
larger than the transaction cost of liabilities. 
Loan ratio as the signal of the company’s future 
opportunities  
Loan ratio is the second classical model based on 
asymmetric information. This examines how the leverage 
can forecast the company’s future market position.  
(Ross 1996) can be considered as a pioneer 
achievement. It supposes two types of companies: 
 Company type A has got high leverage and excellent 
asset quality  
 Company type B has got low leverage and worse asset 
quality  
The companies plan to carry out several projects with 
positive net present value. If a company seems to be an A 
type due to its leverage, it can raise loans up to the Gros 
Present Value (GPV) of its new project, unless it goes 
bankrupt. The same is true in case of a B-type company. 
This ensures the equilibrium circumstances, supposing 
that neither of the companies wants to send incorrect 
signals. If a company A showed itself as being of B type, 
then it would raise a limited amount of loan, but this will 
not be enough to accomplish all its projects. But if a type-
B company showed itself as an A type, and raises more 
loans, it would go bankrupt. Ross assumes that the 
managers have no got share in the companies. Ross 
deducts three important consequences:  
 The Modigliani&Miller irrelevance theory (Modigliani 
& Miller 1958) repeats, in that the cost of equity is 
independent from the financing decision regardless the 
companies’ leverage. 
 The probability of bankruptcy increases with 
increasing leverage.  
 There is a positive correlation between the value of the 
company and the leverage: the firms with high ratings 
raise more loans.  
Herd mentality – Static financial leverage management 
Companies follow other companies when determining 
their leverage. For example, a pharmaceutical company 
chooses low leverage, similarly to the other 
pharmaceutical companies. This assumption is justified by 
empirical studies. A company of a given industry does not 
differ significantly from the industry average. If we see 
what the major factors are that determine the leverage, then 
the most influential factor is the sector of the company.  
It is important to note that it could be dangerous to 
imitate the financing behaviour of fellow company if there 
are big differences in the industry in point of growing 
opportunities and risks. Then there are big differences in 
leverage, too. Secondly, if the given industry is going 
through transformation, the leverage should be changed, 
too.  
We should also note that the stock exchange rewards 
the herding behaviour, so the ordinary invertor appreciates 
those investment targets whose leverage is close to 
average.  If the investor is risk averse, he/she appreciates 
investment opportunities that do not consist of any 
abnormalities (Jaksity 2004). 
INTRODUCTION OF THE 
CORPORATE DATABASE 
The empirical research is based on a database 
containing the annual balance sheets and income statement 
figures of the 5,000 largest Hungarian companies by their 
net sales between 2008 and 2014. Aggregated sector data 
are available; the database does not contain individual 
data. The sectorial identification of company clusters has 
been made by TEÁOR 08 codes3. The company data of the 
service sector were analysed from the database. I have 
chosen this sector because its weight and role show an 
increasing trend in current society, while the weights of the 
other sectors (agriculture, industry) have decreased in the 
previous years and decades. This paper examines the 
corporate structure influencing factors of the nine service 
sectors given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
The distribution of the examined database 
by service sectors 
Service subsector Proportion in 
database (%) 
Freight, warehousing, post, 
telecommunication  
27.6 
Accommodation, hospitality   5.7 
Amusing, cultural and sport 
services  
5.2 
IT services  8.5 
Financial services  12.1 
Real estate services and estate 
rent  
12.6 
Services supporting economic 
activities 
16.3 
Education, research  2.9 
Other services 9.2 
Total  100.0 
Source: Own calculation 
 
 
 
3  TEÁOR is the business sector classification system used in Hungary. 
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The weights were determined by the number of 
companies. As we can see, the category of Freight, 
warehousing, post, telecommunication has the highest 
ratio. The areas of Economic services (including legal, 
accounting, tax advising, HR and administrative services), 
Real estate services and estate rent and Financial services 
also make up substantial parts of the database. 
HYPOTHESES OF RESEARCH 
The paper of Katits &Szemán (2017) can be considered 
as the antecedent of my research. The authors prepared an 
analysis of the capital structure of Hungarian corporate 
sector between 1993 and 2014. The paper stated that the 
Hungarian enterprises generally increased their leverage in 
booming period and decreased in recession. Furthermore, 
the paper found a negative linkage between the 
profitability and the leverage of the economic sectors. The 
Hungarian enterprises tried to keep the maturity matching. 
This work continues to focus on the service sector because 
of its importance, focusing on the period between 2008 and 
2014. I kept in mind that the results of examined 
hypotheses should be focused from the breaking out of the 
economic crisis to the latest available data. 
Profitability – Test of Pecking Order and Trade-Off 
Theory  
Hypothesis 1: There is negative relationship between 
the profitability and capital leverage of service subsectors, 
so if the given subsector is more profitable than the 
average, its capital leverage is less; if, however, its 
profitability is lower than the average, it is forced to 
borrow more money.  
I assume the relevance of the Pecking Order Theory, 
which explains the fact that most empirical studies have 
detected a negative correlation between these two factors 
(e.g., Booth et al. 2001; Szemán 2008). Sufficient internal 
sources are available for profitable companies, so the 
capital leverage is lower, since the request for external 
sources is lower.  
The Trade-Off Theory states that the higher the 
profitability of the company, the higher its tax shield 
potential, so this corporation will raise its leverage. Since 
there are no available individual company data, only 
aggregate sectorial data, only the service subsectors can be 
compared with each other.  
Relationship between the liquidity and the capital 
leverage – Test of Pecking Order and Agent Theory 
Hypothesis 2: The better the liquidity of the service 
subsector, the lower its capital leverage.  
There are several scientific views relating to the 
liquidity in the theories of capital structure. The Pecking 
Order Theory – which is supported by several empirical 
studies – states that the companies with high liquid asset 
stock finance their investments from mobilising their 
liquid assets, and neither borrow nor raise capital. Some 
researchers argue that only companies whose current ratio 
is high have a good chance to borrow money, since they 
can repay their liabilities to the bank.  
The Agent Theory also deals with the issue of liquid 
assets, arguing that borrowing forces the company to make 
continuous interest and principal payments, so it can help 
to control the managers (agents). From this reasoning, the 
aim is to decrease the level of liquid assets and increase the 
capital leverage.  
I have chosen my hypothesis from the Pecking Order 
Theory, because its view is closer to the Hungarian 
historical tradition and mentality, companies could turn to 
loans provided by banks, if they could not realise their 
aims due to their limited liquidity.  
Examination of maturity matching 
Hypothesis 3: Hungarian service sector companies 
keep the principle of maturity matching, namely they 
finance their current assets from current liabilities and 
their non-current assets from equity and non-current 
liabilities.  
Maturity matching means that the company strives to 
match the maturity of its liabilities and the used time of 
their assets. To create a financing strategy, it is important 
to consider the basic rule that the non-current investments 
should be financed from equity and non-current liabilities 
(loans, bonds), while the financing of current assets is 
made from current liabilities. In frame of investigating this 
hypothesis I examine whether the Hungarian service 
companies keep this rule. Earlier empirical research 
proved the relevance of maturity matching (Szemán 2008). 
EXAMINED VARIABLES 
In this part, I present the applied indicators (dependent 
and independent variables) of my hypothesis tests. 
Naturally I know that the capital leverage as a dependent 
variable is determined by the company management, and 
its decision is substantially influenced by the current state 
of the company, which is reflected in the various financial 
indicators. Consequently, the independent variables and 
the dependent variable should have some degree of 
connection, and my aim is to detect how they connect. 
Indicator of capital leverage (dependent variable): 
One of the dependent variables is the ratio between 
total liabilities and equity:  
 Capital Leverage: Total Liabilities/Total Equity. This 
ratio contains not only the non-current but also the 
current liabilities. It measures the general indebtedness 
of the company and shows what percentage of 
liabilities is covered by the equity capital.  
As the classical capital structure means the ratio 
between equity and the non-current liabilities, most 
empirical research uses the non-current liabilities in the 
dependent variable (e.g. Baloghné Balla 2006). So, one of 
the capital leverage indicators used here is the following: 
 Capital Leverage2: Non-current liabilities/Total 
assets. This is one of the “classic” indicators of capital 
structure. Its nominator contains only the non-current 
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liabilities, while the denominator is the total assets. It 
shows the share of non-current liabilities within the 
total sources of the company and reflects the solvency 
of the company and its access to credit.  
The variables of influencing factors (independent 
variables): 
 Profitability: Return on Assets (ROA) = Earnings 
Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) / Total Assets   
 Liquidity: Current Assets / Current Liabilities   
 Maturity matching: Fixed assets / (Total Equity + Non-
Current Liabilities) 
The examination among variables was made with 
SPSS 22.0. Considering the limited number of 
observations, scatter plot charts were made and regression 
lines were fitted in them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: There is negative relationship between 
the profitability and capital leverage of service subsectors, 
so if the given subsector is more profitable than the 
average, its capital leverage is less, if however, its 
profitability is lower than the average, it is forced to 
borrow more loan.   
This hypothesis examines the linkage between 
profitability and capital structure. To test this hypothesis 
the following indicators were used:  
 Profitability indicator: ROA= EBIT/Total assets 
 Capital Leverage = Total liabilities/Total equity. 
 Capital Leverage 2 (Leverage2) = Non-current 
liabilities/Total assets 
The EBIT as profit category was chosen instead of net 
income because the amount of EBIT is neutral to the 
financing structure, namely the interest expense decreases 
the net income, but leaves the EBIT untouched. However, 
the larger the EBIT is, the bigger is the net income ceteris 
paribus (Bozsik 2017). Figure 1 shows the linkage 
between ROA and Capital Leverage:  
 
Source: own calculation based on TOP5000 data 
Figure 1. -Linkage between ROA and Capital Leverage 
Analysing the figure, we can state that there is a weak 
negative relationship between the ROA and the Capital 
Leverage ratio. The low level of R2 indicator also reflects 
this. Thus, no meaningful linkage was found between the 
profitability and the overall indebtedness in the Hungarian 
service sector. The profitability does not influence 
significantly the company’s liabilities. 
The linkage between ROA and Capital Leverage2 
(Non-current Liabilities / Total Assets) shows larger 
negative correlation. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between ROA and 
Capital Leverage2 excluding the real estate and the 
logistics sectors which proved outliers. The reason for this 
may be the special financing structure of these two sectors. 
The real estate companies build offices and flats and 
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finance them from borrowing. Real estate is perfect 
collateral. It is marketable, its market price can be 
precisely determined, it cannot be stolen and the mortgage 
right can be easily validated. The banks gladly finance this 
sector. The logistics sector uses vehicles, and here leasing 
is the ruling form of finance. The vehicles are also perfect 
collateral for leasing, since they are insured against 
damage and theft and if the company does not pay the 
leasing fee, the vehicle quickly returns to the lessor, while 
the vehicle remains in the lessor’s possession during the 
leasing contract.  
To sum up, the logistics and real estate sectors seem 
not to follow Hypotheses 1; they both offer perfect 
collateral for lending, so they are able to borrow at a low 
interest rate due to their negligible risk.  
 
Source: own calculation based on TOP5000 data 
Figure 2. – The linkage between ROA and Capital Leverage2 
excluding real estate and logistic sector  
As can be seen, the figure indicates a strong connection 
between the profitability and capital structure, which 
supports the Pecking Order Theory.  
Summarising the results, the examination supports the 
hypothesis only in case of the Capital Leverage2 indicator 
and the profitability. The reason could be that the Capital 
Leverage includes the current liabilities, but the size of 
current liabilities is probably determined by the maturity 
matching principle (examined later) rather than the profit 
consideration. 
Hypothesis 2: The better the liquidity of the service 
subsector, the lower its capital leverage. 
To test this hypothesis, the relationship between the 
current ratio and the capital leverage ratios was examined.  
The current ratio was calculated for the 9 subsectors in 
the following way: 
Current ratio = Current assets/Current liabilities 
By studying this ratio, we examine whether the 
company is meeting its current payment commitments by 
liquidating its current assets. The current assets can be – 
theoretically – converted to cash in one year to pay the 
short-term liabilities. However, the too-high value is 
optimal only for creditors, because the return of current 
assets is generally significantly lower than or equal to the 
return of fixed assets, thus a too-high ratio of current assets 
decreases the overall return of the total assets. In addition, 
the high value of this ratio does not assure the company’s 
liquidity, since part of current assets is practically 
permanent assets. However, a figure of less than 1 does not 
certainly indicate a prompt insolvency; during the 
continuous operation, if the turnover of the current assets 
is high enough, an elevated level of current liabilities can 
be managed.  
The linkage between Current Ratio and Capital 
Leverage is shown in Figure 3.  
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Source: own calculation based on TOP5000 data 
Figure 3. – The linkage between Current Ratio and Total Liabilities/Total Equity 
The chart doesn’t prove any connection between the 
Current Ratio and Capital Leverage, especially if we 
neglect the financial sector. The very low value of the R2 
indicator (excluding the financial sector, the R2 is 
practically zero) supports this statement. Thus, there is no 
observable connection between the overall indebtedness 
and the liquidity of the company. The liquidity does not 
influence the overall debt of the company.  
Now let’s look at the connection of the Current Ratio 
with the second indicator of capital leverage (Non-current 
liabilities/Total assets) in Figure 4.  
 
Source: own calculation based on TOP5000 data 
Figure 4. – The linkage between Current Ratio and Capital Leverage2 
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As can be seen, a much stronger negative linkage can 
be identified between the two variables. Highly liquid 
companies use lower long-term liabilities than companies 
with smaller liquidity. This result supports the Pecking 
Order Theory. The liquid companies may finance part of 
their investment by liquidating their current assets, which 
is part of their internal source of finance. Summarising the 
results, there is no observable connection between the 
overall indebtedness of the company and the liquidity; 
however, a strong linkage can be seen between the long-
term debt level and the liquidity. The higher is the Current 
Ratio, the lower is the share of long term debt in the 
financing mix, which supports the relevance of the Pecking 
Order Theory.  
Hypothesis 3: The Hungarian service sector 
companies follow the principle of maturity matching; 
namely, they finance their non-current assets from equity 
and non-current liabilities and their current assets from 
current liabilities. 
Historically the question of maturity matching was an 
interesting issue. In the 1990s non-current source of 
finance were very limited, considering either equity or the 
non-current liabilities. However, times have changed, and 
Hypotheses 3 supposes that this scarcity – due to 
privatisation and with the strengthening two-tier bank 
system – is over. 
The calculated indicator in the service sector is the 
following:  
Non-current assets / (Total equity + Non-current 
liabilities): This indicator informs us about the share of 
long term financing funds in the financing of non-current 
assets.  
If the indicator is lower than 1, the company has extra 
non-current funds for financing its permanent current 
assets, and consequently it follows a conservative 
financing strategy. If the indicator is higher than 1, the 
amount of non-current assets exceeds the size of non-
current financing sources, so the company follows an 
aggressive financing strategy. The results are plotted in 
Table 2.  
Table 2 
The indicator of Non-Current Assets / (Total Equity + Non-Current Liabilities) 
between 2008 and 2014 
Maturity matching 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average 
Other 0,91 0,92 0,83 0,78 0,88 0,74 0,68 0,82 
Economic 0,62 0,71 0,77 0,64 0,57 0,59 0,62 0,65 
Real estate 1,25 1,37 1,19 1,16 1,13 1,08 1,00 1,17 
IT services 0,57 0,68 0,61 0,80 0,79 0,90 0,83 0,74 
Education 0,85 0,58 0,75 0,58 0,59 0,99 0,65 0,71 
Financial 1,64 1,68 1,75 2,16 2,37 1,99 1,92 1,93 
Accomodation 1,03 0,58 1,16 1,03 1,00 0,95 0,89 0,95 
Logistic -0,27 1,36 2,25 1,16 -0,77 1,00 1,07 0,83 
Cultural 0,70 1,10 0,88 1,18 1,23 0,80 0,86 0,96 
Total 0,77 0,90 0,98 0,93 0,80 0,89 0,86 0,87 
Source: own calculation based on TOP5000 data 
The Financial sector is an outlier, and its non-current 
sources are very limited, since the deposits are mostly 
short-term. The Logistics sector’s negative equity 
underwent very extreme volatility during the period. The 
rest of the service sector generally follows a conservative 
financing strategy, so the service sector does not bear high 
financial risk in Hungary. Especially conservative are the 
Education and research and the IT sectors. Only the Real 
estate sector had a ratio higher than 1, but the value of its 
aggressive strategy continuously decreased during the 
period. The Culture sector had a ratio with relatively high 
volatility whose value was over 1 in 2011 and 2012.  
To sum up, the service sector generally followed the 
maturity matching principle. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the TOP5000 corporate database between 
2008 and 2014, the aggregate figures of service sector have 
supported the Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.  
There is a negative linkage between the profitability 
and the capital leverage of the service sector, thus if the 
companies have available internal sources – which is 
mostly determined by the profitability of the company – 
then the companies use these sources rather than borrow 
money. However, these linkages can be only proved for 
the indicator Capital Leverage2, except for Real estate and 
Logistics services, which are outliers. The facts generally 
support the relevance of Pecking Order Theory rather than 
the Trade-Off Theory.  
The larger the liquidity of the sector, the lower its 
capital leverage. A negative linkage can be found between 
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the Current Ratio and Capital Leverage2. Here the real 
estate sector was the outlier. The facts also support the 
relevance of the Pecking Order Theory against the Agent 
Theory.  
The Hungarian service sector companies generally 
follow the maturity matching principle, i.e. they finance 
their non-current assets from non-current sources, namely 
from equity and from non-current liabilities. The overall 
financial strategy of Hungarian service sector companies 
in one subsector, real estate and rent, became more 
conservative during the 2008-2014 period. This tendency 
can be explained by the increasing role of equity in 
finance. 
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